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Qu'est-ce que Ie moi? 
Un homme qui se met a Ia fenetre pour voir Ies 
passants; si je passe par la, puis-je dire qu'il s'est 
mis Ia pour me voir? Non; car il ne pense pas a 
moi en particulier; mais celui qui aime quelqu'un 
a cause de sa beaute, l'aime-t-iI? Non; car Ia petite 
verole, qui tuera Ia beaute sans tuer Ia personne, 
fera qu'il ne I'aimera plus. 
Et si on m'aime pour mon jugement, pour rna 
memoire, m'aime-t-on? moi?Non, car je puis perdre 
ces qualites sans me perdre moi-meme. Oil est donc 
ce moi, s'il n'est ni dans Ie corps, ni dans l'ame? et 
comment aimer Ie corps ou I'ame, sinon pour ces 
qualites, qui ne seront point ce qui fait Ie moi, 
puisqu'elles sont perissables? car aimerait-on Ia 
substance de I'ame d'une personne, abstraitement, 
et quelques qualites qui y fussent? Cela ne se peut, 
et serait injuste. On n'aime donc jamais personne, 
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The subject of this book is the first person in thought and language. The 
main question concerns what we mean when we say 'J'. Related to it are 
questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are 
needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The 
emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'J', but a fair amount 
of space is devoted to 'I' -thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in 
cognition. 
The purpose is to give a picture of how we think and talk about ourselves 
in a wide range of circumstances. The topic has been discussed in numerous 
articles during the last decades, but rarely in the form of a monograph. I felt 
the need for a book of this kind while working on my dissertation. The 
manuscript is the result of many years of reflection on the self and indexicals. 
Some of the theories that I advance have developed as a result of my teaching 
an undergraduate course in the philosophy of language the last couple of 
years. 
In the book, several different issues are brought together in order to give 
a coherent theory of 'J', pertaining both to the philosophy of language and 
the philosophy of mind. Among these, the reader will find the immunity to 
error through misidentification that is exhibited by 'I' in some of its uses, the 
relation between direct reference, rigid designation, and essentialism, the 
role that non-conceptual content plays to cognition, and the nature of the 
unity of consciousness and personal identity. The idea has been rather to 
give a wide/broad picture of 'I' and 'I'-thoughts than to treat exhaustively 
every particular issue that is raised. 
The main thesis is that 'I' refers indirectly through a de re sense to the 
speaker as presented in the context of utterance. 'I' also expresses a stable 
individual concept. How the information expressed by the de re sense is 
gained is explained by a theory of non-conceptual content. Further, it is 
argued that the concept of a speaker is intertwined with the concept of a 
person. Persons are such that they can self-ascribe and be ascribed both 
mental and bodily predicates and that they can think about themselves from 
both a first-person and a third-person perspective. 
The book is intended for philosophers in general, especially those interested 
in matters having to do with the concept of the self or the concept of a 
person and those with a general interest in the philosophy of language. The 
text is also accessible to graduate students and advanced undergraduates. 
ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
During my work on this manuscript I have received a great deal of help, of 
different kinds and from many quarters. I will take the opportunity to express 
my gratitude to all those without whom this book would not have been 
possible. 
First, I would like to thank the participants in the seminar in theoretical 
philosophy at the Department of Philosophy in Lund, lead by Bengt Hansson, 
for acute and unexpected comments on the subject. Especially Anna-Sofia 
Maurin, Johannes Persson, and Fredrik Stjernberg have devoted a lot of 
time to the manuscript in its various versions. Linus Brostrom struggled 
through an early version of it. 
Parts of the manuscript have been presented to audiences at conferences 
and seminars in other places than Lund, among them Columbia University, 
Gothenburg University, and Linkoping University, as well as the Conference 
for Swedish Philosophy in Umea, the loth International Congress of Logic, 
Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Florence, and the Second European 
Congress for Analytic Philosophy in Leeds. All comments have been most 
welcome. 
lowe much to the astute minds of Peter Gardenfors and Sten Lindstrom. 
My advisor Nils-Eric Sahlin has given me invaluable support in many respects 
over the years. These people have all, in their own ways, been sources of 
inspiration for my work. 
I have benefited from a great number of travel grants from, among others, 
Crafoordska stiftelsen, Gyllenstiernska Krapperupstiftelsen, and Wallenbergs 
stiftelse. Several trips have gone to the Centre de Recherche en Epistemologie 
Appliquee (CREA) in Paris, where I have enjoyed the hospitable and witty 
atmosphere. I have especially profited from discussions with Fran~ois Recanati. 
Knut och Alice Wallenbergs stiftelse made it possible for me to spend a very 
rewarding year at Columbia University in New York under the supervision 
of Akeel Bilgrami. I am also grateful for financial support from Erik och 
Gurli Hultengrens fond for filosofi, Erik Philip Sorensens stiftelse, and Hjalmar 
Gullbergs och Greta Thotts stipendiefond. 
Special thanks to Jan Hartman. In spite of that your ardent efforts to tum 
me into an analytic philosopher have not been completely successful, I hope 
you are not too disappointed in the result. Thank you for being there. 
Thanks also for the encouragement and support from all my friends and 
the people at my department, who have come and gone during the period 
xi 
xii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
that I have been working with the manuscript. I mention no one so that no 
one will feel left out. 
Finally, I dedicate this book to my mother, Gunvor Brinck-Lindroth, 
who, being a scholar herself, has stood by me through thick and thin, and 
without whom this book would not have seen the light. 
